Axel Magnuson

It is bizarre to sit in an airport and hear reports that the country you’re about to go live in has just decided to confirm the presidency of a man whose political organization had patently manipulated the electoral system to sustain his position.

Afghan election overdue

In a series of steps, starting with Abdullah Abdullah’s decision not to run, the prospects for a housecleaning in Afghanistan dissolved almost before our eyes. The much called for ending of corruption in the development of physical infrastructure and social services will now seem an impossibility to some. Without a strong political mandate, Karzai will have a hard time removing parts of his government and those provincial Governors  and Councils who act as barriers to getting government services to the people in the hinterlands, a phenomenon that has been described as being the major “push” factor driving the resurgence of the Taliban.

The Obama response to this will be difficult. Already delaying a decision on sending more troops while waiting for the results of the now-canceled presidential election, he has less political support to send more troops now. Several streams of nascent resistance to the enlargement of the war have emerged. The voting public was already hesitant to support an Afghan run-off election it saw as at a minimum to be messy and maximally as a sign of deep corruption. Others sense the impossibility of the country emerging from warlordism and the economic stagnation associated with it and thus an extended period of armed conflict for US forces. Still others see the very presence of US and NATO troops as an incitement to more Taliban activity.

The strategic response to this is going to require some reframing of the situation. While almost everything that we want to happen in Afghanistan is represented as hinging on military success, real economic and social service development is a critical, but seldom acknowledged, part of the dynamic. Yes, say supporters of an increased military levels, but we can’t drive development without first having security. The response, by observers in Afghanistan, is that where local government is able to deliver the goods that its citizens want, the level of security increases. Where there is poor performance by local administration, the situation remains shaky.

The link between troops and economic development may be less robust than the link between local administration and development, so the freezing-in-place of current Provincial governments, Governors and Provincial Councils, may be the biggest blow yet to the prospects of providing economic development as a key to the counterinsurgency prospects. So an important part of the Afghan strategy, reflected in General McChrystal’s August report and in President Karzai’s recent statements, is a refocusing on what happens at the very local level.